each day. We ask Catholics and others of good will to help meet the material, social and spiritual needs of families separated from loved ones by detention and removal, to ensure that their communities do no profit from the misery caused by the criminalization and confinement of immigrants, and to work steadfastly to reform the laws that undergird the US immigrant detention system. We urge Catholic institutions to increase their commitment to immigrant detainees and their families. We urge the Administration and Congress to build an immigration system that affords due process protections, honors human dignity and minimizes the use of detention.
The following report is a result of our visits to detention centers across the nation-in Texas, California, Illinois, Arizona, and New Jersey. It examines the flaws in the current U.S. immigrant detention system and their impact on the human rights and dignity of our fellow human beings, and offers recommendations for reform of the system.
We endorse the findings and recommendations of this report. 
I. A Vision for Reform
The US immigrant detention system grew more than fivefold between 1994 and 2013. During these years, the average daily detained population rose from 6,785 to 34, 260 ( Figure 1 ). The number of persons detained annually increased from roughly 85,000 persons in 1995 to 440, 557 in 2013 (Kerwin 1996, 1; Simansky 2014, 6) . Since the beginning of the Obama administration's detention reform initiative in 2009, annual detention numbers have reached record levels ( Figure 2 ). More persons pass through the U.S. immigrant detention system each year than through federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) facilities (Meissner et al. 2013, 131) .
This growth has occurred in what may be the most troubled institution in the vast U.S. immigration enforcement system. The numbers only hint at the toll that this system exacts in despair, fractured families, human rights violations, abandoned legal claims, and diminished national prestige.
The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) lacks the authority to imprison criminals and does not hold anybody awaiting trial or serving a criminal sentence. Congress and DHS use the anodyne language of "processing" and "detention" to describe this system. Yet each year DHS's Immigration and Customs Enforcement agency (ICE) holds hundreds of thousands of non-citizens and the occasional U.S. citizen (Carcamo 2014) , many for extended periods, in prisons, jails, and other secure facilities where their lives are governed by standards designed for criminal defendants. Detention brands immigrants as criminals in the public's eye and contributes to the sense that they deserve to be treated as such.
In many respects, immigrant detainees are treated less favorably than criminal defendants. U.S. mandatory detention laws cover broad categories of non-citizens, including lawful permanent residents (LPRs), asylum-seekers, petty offenders, and persons with U.S. families and other strong and longstanding ties to the United States. Sixty percent of the unauthorized have resided in the United States for 10 years or more and 17 percent for at least 20 years (Warren and Kerwin 2015, 86-87, 99) . Moreover, DHS has interpreted the laws to preclude the release of mandatory detainees, even release coupled with the most intensive restrictions and monitoring. By way of contrast, most criminal defendants receive custody hearings by judicial officers shortly after their apprehension and they can be released subject to conditions that will reasonably ensure their court appearance and protect the public.
Detention is treated as a pillar of the U.S. immigration enforcement system akin to border control or removal, but in fact it is a means to an end that would be far better Detainees, FY 1994 served by a more humane, less costly system. Its purpose is to ensure that non-citizens in removal proceedings appear for their hearings and, if they are removable and lack legal relief, that their removal can be effected. Detention is also justified as a tool to protect others, although this consideration is more relevant to the criminal justice system. In fact, there are tested, effective, and humane ways to accomplish these goals short of detention. Supervised or conditional release programs have long been a mainstay of the criminal justice system, but have only recently begun to gain traction in the immigration context. Moreover, detention makes it far less likely that indigent and low-income immigrants will be able to secure legal counsel and, thus, to present their claims for relief and protection.
In 2009, DHS-ICE discontinued the detention of immigrant families at the T. Don Hutto Residential Facility, a privately owned, 512-bed, former medium security prison in Taylor, Texas, that had been the subject of law suits and scathing human rights reports (Bernstein 2009 ). It also suspended plans for three new family detention centers, leaving only 38 families with children in ICE facilities (Schriro 2009, 11) .
However, in response to the dramatic increase in the migration of parents and minor children from Honduras, Guatemala and El Salvador in Fiscal Year (FY) 2014, the Obama administration has opened new family detention facilities which will have a combined capacity of roughly 3,700 beds (Cowan and Edwards 2014; Wilder 2014; DHS-ICE 2014d) .
Conditions at detention facilities are particularly ill-suited and harmful to children.
1 Many argue that they violate the minimum standards for the detention and treatment of children set forth in the settlement of the Flores v. Meese litigation in 1997. Detention can cause children anxiety, depression, sleep difficulties, regression in academic achievement and language development, social withdrawal, and post-traumatic stress (Fazel, Karunakara and Newnham 2014) . It also violates the internationally-recognized "best interests of the child standard." For these reasons, immigrant families should not be detained.
Immigrant detention may be necessary for short periods in limited circumstances, including during screening and processing of non-citizens by immigration officials and, in rare cases, to hold persons who are not likely to appear for their removal hearings or who will pose a danger even if they are subject to the most restrictive forms of supervised release. 2 Some past studies have shown that persons released and advised to appear for court hearings-often in the distant future and at distant locales-fail to appear at acceptable rates. This is not surprising since they may not understand the instructions they have been given or the requirement to appear. That said, our proposed system would ensure high court appearance rates by providing a continuum of supervised release/community support programs based on risk of flight and danger. Similar programs have been shown to be highly successful at ensuring high appearance rates.
Detention should not be used as a central immigration "management" tool. Instead, the status quo should be replaced by a system characterized by timely, individual- Since 2009, the Obama administration has worked to reform the U.S. detention system, achieving several incremental successes. However, in the interim, the number of detainees annually has increased ( Figure 2 ). Moreover, the overwhelming majority of detainees will still be held in prisons, jails and prison-like facilities at the end of the reform initiative. 3 In short, deeper reforms are needed.
Persons who, with sufficient supervision and community support, would appear for their immigration proceedings, should not be detained. The current system, which is based on a correctional, criminal, and national security paradigm, should be replaced by one that reflects DHS-ICE's legal authorities and the nature of those in its custody.
The number of immigrant detention facilities should be substantially contracted, the role of for-profit prisons in administering this system should be reduced, and detention should be used only as a last resort when less harmful strategies and programs -viewed on a continuum, beginning with the least restrictive (release on recognizance) and moving to release programs with rising levels of su- FYI 2001 FYI -2013 danger to the public and threats to national security. As it stands, mandatory detention has served as a poor proxy for dangerousness and flight risk and, thus, has impeded effective management of the detention system (DHS OIG 2006, 5-6) . Immigration judges or judicial officers should be vested with the authority to make custody decisions soon after detention for every person facing removal, including those subject to expedited, summary, administrative, and noncourt removals. In addition, all persons facing removal should be afforded a hearing before an immigration judge.
Finally, detention makes it far more difficult for indigent and low-income immigrants to secure counsel and, as a result, to present their legal claims for relief and protection, including asylum. Given its responsibility to afford due process and its strong interest in fully informed and efficient decision-making, the U.S. government should fund legal counsel for indigent persons in removal proceedings, particularly detainees.
Don't Take My Sweater
The family detention facility in Artesia, New Mex- were intended to serve as a "blueprint" and guide to the DHS-ICE detention reform initiative, while the UNHCR standards primarily cover asylum-seekers and were intended for a global audience.
U.S. immigration law allows for the release of non-mandatory detainees if they would not "pose a danger to property or persons" and are "likely to appear" for proceedings.
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The ABA immigrant detention standards posit a more limited purpose for detention: "to ensure court appearances and effect removal." (ABA 2012, Introduction decisions to continue to detain should be regularly revisited." (ibid.). This principle assumes particular importance when applied to children. The UNHCR has appropriately made an end to child detention the first goal of its "global strategy … to end the detention of asylum seekers and ref-
ugees." (UHNCR 2014, 17).
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The ABA envisions a continuum of ATD programs. (ibid., note 1). If after considering all the alternatives, detention is deemed necessary to ensure court appearances in an individual case, then the ABA would place the detainee in a facility that "might be closely analogized to 'secure' nursing homes, residential treatment facilities, domestic violence shelters, or in in-patient psychiatric treatment facilities" that seek to "normalize living conditions … to the greatest extent possible." (Ibid., 3).
The ABA sets forth detailed standards to guide many aspects of custodial life. For example, the ABA provides a series of standards on access to religious services. 7 Overall, the ABA standards argue for the need to replace the status quo system of (mostly) prisons and jails governed by standards designed for criminal pre-trial defendants, with a more humane, cost-effective system that is appropriate for non-citizens in civil removal proceedings. Yet U.S. interdiction, interception and detention policies prevent migrants from reaching U.S. territorial boundaries and securing protection (Flynn 2014) . These policies have also inspired several states to "externalize" their immigration enforcement policies and, thus, to evade their responsibilities to protect refugees and others in need (ibid.).
The UNHCR guidelines affirm that "the right to seek asylum must be respected" and asylum seekers must not be penalized for illegal entry or stay. Yet the U.S. detention system leads asylum seekers to abandon their claims, which would be reason enough to reform the system. Because asylum-seekers enjoy the rights to liberty, human security, and free movement, the UNHCR standards provide that detention "should be a measure of last resort, with liberty being the default position" (UNHCR 2012, 14) .
Like the ABA standards, the UNHCR guidelines provide that detention must be based on an individualized assessment, and must be necessary, reasonable, and proportionate to a "legitimate purpose." (Ibid., ¶ 2). The UNHCR believes that detention "may be permissible" for short periods to "carry out initial identity and security checks," and "can be exceptionally resorted to" for three legitimate purposes:
"to protect the public order" (which allows the detention of those "likely to abscond" or who otherwise "refuse to cooperate with the authorities"); to protect public health;
and to protect national security (ibid., ¶ 24, 28-30) . Moreover, the guidelines state that decisions to detain or extend detention must be subject to procedural safeguards; detention conditions must be humane and dignified; the special needs and circumstances of asylum-seekers should be taken into account; and detention should be subject to independent monitoring and inspection by international and regional bodies and non-governmental organizations (NGOs).
Because detention decisions require an individualized assessment, the UNHCR guidelines consider "mandatory or automatic detention" to be "arbitrary" and impermissible (ibid., ¶ 18-20) . Moreover, they provide that detention must be "in accordance with and authorized by law" and the law must offer sufficient protections against arbitrary detention, which includes indefinite detention. The guidelines prohibit detention "to deter future asylum-seekers, or to dissuade those who have commenced their claims from pursuing them," or for punitive purposes (ibid., ¶ 32).
UNHCR would require that ATD programs -from "reporting requirements to structured community supervision and/or case management programmes" -be considered "part of an overall assessment of the necessity, reasonableness and proportionality" of detention (ibid., ¶ 35). Its guidelines provide that detention should be used only as a "last resort" and when a "less invasive or coercive means"
A Visit to Karnes, Texas • 103 facilities owned by states, localities and private entities which held roughly one-third of ICE detainees between 2010 and 2012 (via intergovernmental service agreements (IGSAs)), and which also held criminal inmates.
• Nine state, local and private (contract) facilities, holding 22 percent of detainees, which housed only immigrant detainees.
• Seven contract facilities, holding 19 percent of immigrant detainees, which are owned and operated by for-profit prison agencies.
• 125 state, local and private facilities, holding 14 percent of ICE detainees pursuant to IGSAs with the U.S. Marshals Service.
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• Six "service processing centers," containing 12 percent of ICE detainees that are owned by ICE and operated by ICE employees and contractors.
• Residential family detention centers which will ultimately house more than 3,700 persons (includ- ICE has not publicized the actual (evolving) criteria used to make "automated" custody and placement decisions. Thus, it remains difficult to assess whether this new enforcement tool will meaningfully alter custody rates and placement patterns, or will instead automatize continued overreliance on detention.
At the outset of the DHS-ICE detention reform initiatives, the founding director of ICE's Office of Detention Policy and Planning wrote that while immigrant detention "is unlike federal detention as a matter of law," both criminal convicts and civil detainees were:
… held in secure facilities with hardened perimeters in remote locations, generally at considerable distances from counsel and/or their communities.
With but a few exceptions, the facilities that ICE uses to detain aliens were originally built as jails and prisons to confine pre-trial and sentenced fel- The same holds true today. Six years into ICE's reform initiative, the great majority of ICE detainees continue to be held in jails, prisons and prison-like facilities, subject to standards based on American Correctional Association (ACA) standards for criminal defendants awaiting the disposition of their cases. Moreover, this will remain the case for the great majority of detainees even after ICE's reform initiative has been fully implemented (HRF 2011, 18) . Several problems have long plagued this system, and require far deeper reforms than are currently being contemplated. According to ICE's 2009 assessment of the U.S. detention system, the agency's lack of expertise and experience in this area made it "difficult" to develop guidance and evaluate the performance of contractors (Schriro 2009, 16) . The study also reported on ICE's failure to "formally publish policy and procedure or technical manuals specific to detention." (ibid.
IV. The Misuse of Detention
). An analysis of ICE information systems that same year concluded that the agency failed to collect sufficient information that would allow it to identify persons eligible for possible release or to track compliance with its own standards (Kerwin and Lin 2009 ). This finding explained, in part, years of futility by government oversight and human rights agencies that criticized the detention system for its failures to abide by established legal standards and to safeguard rights. In 2014, the GAO reported that data collection and maintenance limitations prevented ICE headquarters from evaluating whether field offices had complied with its guidance related to the transition to less restrictive "technology-only" ATD program following a period of compliance with the "full-service" program (GAO 2014, 20-26) . In addition, the GAO faulted ICE for not collecting data on appearance rates for participants in "technology-only" ATD programs (ibid., 31).
Unfortunately, severe problems have persisted since the inception of DHS-ICE's detention reform initiative. In March
2015, USCCB's Migration and Refugee Services (MRS)
called for an end to family detention, arguing that the government's use of detention in order to deter migration violated international law, led to the return of young mothers and children to perilous situations, and undermined the "best interests" of the child standard (MRS 2015, 2-4).
Other recent reports have documented: • the extensive lobbying by for-profit prison corporations and the rising share of immigrants detained in private facilities (Carson and Diaz 2015, 6, 11-14) ;
• the legal severance of parent-child relationships as a result of U.S. detention and deportation practices (ARC 2011);
• prolonged detention in a system intended for short-term custody (Heeren 2010 );
• federal officials that pressure detainees without legal counsel to "stipulate" to removal, often based on inaccurate information and a promise of diminished time in custody (Koh et al. 2011 );
• confining children and others arrested by the Border Patrol in extremely cold holding cells for extended periods (AIJ 2013);
• hunger strikes in response to poor conditions in the Northwest Detention Center in Tacoma,
Washington and the Stewart Detention Center in
Lumpkin, Georgia (Altman 2014; Redmon 2014 );
• the use of long-term, unchecked solitary confinement in ICE contract facilities (NIJC and PHR 2012);
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• sexual abuse, harassment, and deficiencies in reporting on and recording incidents of sexual misconduct (HRW 2010; GAO 2013, 18-24) ;
• violence, verbal abuse and discrimination against lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender persons (Gruberg 2013.) ;
• the immigration system's failure to provide caseby-case custody determinations or to rely sufficiently on ATDs (LIRS 2011);
• deficiencies in for-profit, contract facilities (Human Rights Advocates 2010; Mason 2012);
• problems related to due process, legal access, transfers, segregation, overcrowding and religious expression in detention facilities in Georgia (ACLUGA 2012); and
• lower legal representation rates among detained immigrants in the San Francisco Immigration Court and the difference counsel makes in case outcomes (NCCIJ 2014).
As these reports suggest, the high costs, hardships, and abuses created by the large-scale use of detention will persist without fundamental change. Although laudable, the current reform initiative has not gone deep enough and will not, by itself, create a truly "civil" system, designed to minimize the use of detention, ensure appearances during the adjudication and removal process, and promote due process and informed decision-making in individual cases.
V. A National Security and Criminal Paradigm
At the heart of the federal immigrant detention system is an anomaly. On the one hand, persons subject to detention are in a civil (not criminal) process, albeit one which could result in their removal, separation from family, loss of livelihood, and return to a place where they may have few ties or face extreme danger.
On the other hand, a criminal justice/national security paradigm has shaped, guided and spurred the growth of the U.S. immigration enforcement and detention system. It is not surprising that immigrants have been treated as criminals and security threats, given that they are subject to a legal regime and to custody by an agency devoted to protecting the homeland against terrorism and transnational crime (DHS 2014c, 14) . 15 The fact that DHS-ICE regularly reports on its detention and removal of "criminal aliens"
contributes to this misconception.
For those without criminal histories, detention can be a dispiriting, even crushing response from a nation which they will soon join, rejoin, or be forced to leave, and from which they had hoped far better and more. Immigration enforcement has become so intertwined with the federal criminal justice system that the U.S. Supreme
Court has held that the failure of attorneys to advise clients on the immigration consequences of criminal plea agreements constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.
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CBP and ICE refer more cases for criminal prosecution and account for more matters "concluded" by U.S. Attorneys than all other federal law enforcement agencies combined (Meissner, et al. 2013, 99-100; Motivans 2013, 14) . In 2010, more than one-half of the suspects arrested and booked by the U.S. Marshals Service were arrested by DHS agencies (Motivans 2013, 7) .
In 2013, immigration-related cases represented 63 percent Al Qaeda presence, and migrants from Haiti (Kerwin 2005 , 759-761, Kerwin 2002 . Not only have "preventive"
and "pre-textual" detention been criticized from a civil lib-
A Border Patrol Agency conducts a pat down of a female Mexican being placed in a holding facility. Photo Credit: Customs and Border Patrol/US Government
erties and international law perspective, but according to national security experts these tactics make it difficult to uproot terrorist conspiracies because they alienate members of communities that might otherwise be a source of intelligence (Kerwin 2005, 761) .
VI. The Problem of Mandatory Detention
The These latter two decisions have led to a decrease in the number of non-citizens with orders of removal who are in prolonged or indefinite detention, but long-term detention persists for large numbers of persons with pending removal proceedings (Kerwin and Lin 2009, 16-18 Table 4) . 34 Yet the percentage of released criminal defendants who failed to appear for court hearings -i.e., the primary criterion in the immigrant detention context --did not exceed Moreover, ICE will not ask local law enforcement to hold or detain non-citizens beyond the time they would normally be held, but simply to notify ICE prior to the release of a non-citizen in state or local custody (ibid.). • Stipulated orders of removal, in which a non-citizen waives his or her right to a formal removal proceeding -often due to pressure from government officials and a desire to escape detention (Koh, Srikantiah, and Tumlin 2011, 3-7) firms, as well as its own in-house lobbyists (Mason 2012, 13) . Generally, CCA has sought appropriations for ICE, Bureau of Prisons and USMS which can be used to fund its detention work (ibid., 14). For-profit prison agencies also helped to champion "model" state enforcement legislation that gave rise to Arizona's SB 1070 and other draconian state bills (Sullivan 2010) , which the U.S. bishops strongly opposed. Many provisions in these bills were found to be unconstitutional.
VII. Reasons for the Growth of Immigrant

Detention
One of the guiding principles of the current detention reform initiative is the need to "provide federal oversight of key detention operations and track performance and outcomes." (Schriro 2009 ). Yet according to the founding director of its Office of Detention Policy and Planning, ICE's lack of expertise in administering the immigrant detention system has undermined "its ability to identify services for which it should contract, to oversee its contracts with states, localities, and for-profit prisons, to assess perfor-mance under these contracts, and to address deficiencies." (Schriro 2010 (Schriro , 1442 . Given the substantial privatization of the U.S. immigrant detention system, there is a particular need for robust government oversight to promote compliance with standards and to correct breaches of them (Flynn and Cannon 2009, 7).
As one global study has concluded, the incentive for for-profit corporations to perform well can be undermined Since the ankle bracelet's removal , Esmerelda has been much more active in her community and she cooks at her parish for special events. She is an active member of her parish and assists the priest with projects in the community.
immigrants as criminals (Ackerman and Furman 2013) , creating an environment conducive to seeing even the most vulnerable as a business opportunity (Flatow 2014) . For all of these reasons, private corporations should have a more limited and modest role in a shrinking detention system. In 2013, there were roughly 22,090 persons in ATD programs on an average night, with the great majority in full-service programs (Table 2 ), compared to roughly 34,000 in detention facilities. In addition a total of 40,864 unique or individual non-citizens participated in these two programs in FY 2013 (GAO 2014, 13-14) . Because immigration courts fast-track the cases of detainees, persons in ATD programs remain in those program on average for longer periods than detainees remain in custody. Yet even accounting for slower turnover among ATD participants than detainees, ATD programs cost substantially less than FY 2005 FY -2014 cation and removal process, and, in rare cases, to protect the public -can be served more efficiently and humanely through a large-scale investment in supervised release, case management and community support programs, than through detention. 49 As an overarching recommendation, the U.S. immigrant detention system should be replaced with a flexible, humane and less costly continuum of release programs that honor due process, uphold the rights of non-citizens and ensure court appearances and removal.
IX. Need to Expand the
As a preliminary step toward that goal, Congress should commission a comprehensive study on the benefits, challenges, cost, and time frame for creating a truly civil immigrant detention system. This study should include a review of the pre-trial release infrastructure of federal and state criminal justice systems, and an analysis of how these systems could serve as a template for a court-based immigration "compliance" system to replace the current detention First, immigrant detention has too often been used as a "deterrent" to illegal migration and even de facto refugee flows, as well as a broad brush strategy to uncover and disrupt possible terrorist conspiracies. 50 It has also been employed as part of a broader enforcement strategy to prevent refugees and other migrants who are fleeing violence from reaching territorial protection (Flynn 2014 ies of legality and, at times, has been counter-productive.
Rather than putting immigration and protection policies in service to the human person (Benedict XVI 2007) , these strategies have treated human beings as a means to an end. The well-being of individuals should not be sacrificed to broad, often misguided law enforcement and national security strategies. Our nation can achieve security only by respecting human rights, not by undermining them.
In initiates. Yet these agencies have supported draconian enforcement laws, which they presumably think will lead to greater business opportunities. In addition, they have reportedly lobbied for services that government agencies do not want or need (Dow 2004, 97 Sixth, ICE's 2009 assessment of the U.S. detention system highlighted several problems related to its information systems, including the sufficiency of data collected, the data's reliability, its availability, its storage, and its strategic use (Schriro 2009, 3, 15-18) . A separate report concluded that ICE did not collect sufficient information to allow it to identify persons who should be considered for release or to ensure adherence with its own standards of confinement (Kerwin and Lin 2009, 5) . Problems with data collection and use continue to undermine the integrity of the detention system. This is evidenced by ICE's failure to track court appearance rates by participants in one of its signature ATD programs and its inability to measure compliance with its guidance to place non-citizens in less restrictive ATD programs after they have successfully met full-service program requirements for 90 days (GAO 2014, 20-22, 31) .
ICE should undertake and communicate the results of a comprehensive analysis of its "information systems." This review should identify the information ICE tracks on those subject to its custody; how, when, and which officials collect, enter, and can access this information; its quality control procedures; and the accessibility of this information to congressional oversight committees, government watchdog agencies, and relevant ICE officials.
Seventh, the detention of families with children, particularly detention for the purpose of attempting to deter others It will take time to transition from a system characterized by prisons, jails, and jail-like facilities, to one characterized by supervised release, case-management and community-based support programs. Therefore, the federal government should proceed with these reforms with all deliberate haste.
XI Endnotes
40 Under the law, immigration judges are required to determine if the waivers are "voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. " 8 CFR § 1003.25(b) .
41 One study also counts voluntary return or departure as an additional summary, non-court form of removal. Under it, non-citizens agree to leave the country, but without receiving a formal removal order with all its negative legal consequences. However, this process can ill-serve persons with a legal claim to remain. An estimated 23,455 voluntary returns took place in FY 2013 (ACLU 2014, 23) .
42 While court backlogs can partly be explained by the growth in the US enforcement system, they are also due in part to ICE's insufficient use of alternative to detention programs.
43 The US immigrant detention system served as the gateway for these private company's entry into the correctional field (Green and Mazón 2012, 9; McDonald 1994; Flynn 2014) .
44 While this section primarily addresses for-profit prisons, humanitarian organizations provide detention services in Portugal, France and elsewhere (Flynn and Cannon 2009, 16) .
45 One report found that the emphasis by private prisons on cost-cutting can lead to substandard conditions, understaffed facilities, poorly compensated guards, less training, higher turnover, and greater levels of abuse (Mason 2012, 12) . The CCA-operated T. Don Hutto Residential Center in Williamson County, Texas for detained immigrant families was, for example, the object of numerous scathing reports (see, LIRS and Women's Commission 2007).
46 MRS is now administering an integrated, community-based ATD pilot program for persons who would otherwise be detained, including asylum-seekers, torture survivors, pregnant women, primary caregivers, the elderly and victims of crime.
47 The technology assisted program uses monitoring technology only and does not include case management services (DHS 2014b, 62-63) .
48 In FY 2012, the ATD program's performance measures were adjusted: final hearing appearance rates and average cost per participant are no longer the primary focus. Instead, the ATD program focuses on the number of removals (GAO 2014, 65) .
49 The UNHCR detention guidelines describe a range of ATDs for asylum-seekers, including release with reporting to immigration authorities or case managers, release on the condition that the asylum-seeker will reside in a particular residence, release on bond or on the condition that a guarantor or surety assumes responsibility for ensuring court appearances, and release with community support and supervision programs (UNHCR 2012, 41-45) . Similarly, the ABA civil detention standards identify a "continuum of strategies and programs" short of detention, from "release on recognizance or parole, to release on bond, to community-based supervised release programs, to 'alternative to detention' programs with various levels of supervision, to home detention (with strict conditions) that represent an alternative 'form' of detention, to detention in civil detention facilities." (ABA 2012, 4, note 1).
50 The DHS Office of Immigration Statistics defines detention more narrowly as the "physical custody of an alien in order to hold him/her, pending a determination on whether the alien is to be removed from the United States or awaiting return transportation to his/her country of citizenship, after a final order of removal has been entered." (Simansky and Sapp 2013, 2) .
51 The ABA civil detention standards provide that detention should only be used based upon "an objective determination that he or she presents a threat to national security or public safety or a substantial flight risk that cannot be mitigated through parole, bond, or a less restrictive form of custody or supervision." (ABA 2012, 4).
52 To point out this precedent is not to propose that ORR be vested with responsibility for the majority of adults in removal proceedings or who are awaiting removal.
53 As the Supreme Court stated in Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 US 678, 690 , freedom "from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint-lies at the heart of the liberty" interest protected by the Fifth Amendment's due process clause.
54 The ABA civil detention standards likewise provide that "independent observers should be permitted to monitor conditions in facilities, to assess compliance with these standards, and to issue public reports with findings and recommendations." (ABA 2012, 5 
